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Abstract. The future of energy supply lies in smart grids, which enable energy 
supply to and from consumers. These two-way energy networks require smart 
energy metering systems. The vision of smart grids will require one or more 
decades yet to be fully realised, but since a roll-out of smart meters is a lengthy 
process, countries are already starting to implement smart metering legislation, 
following the European legal framework on energy efficiency. Rolling out 
smart meters, however, requires smart legislation. The Dutch example, where 
the Senate blocked two smart metering bills in 2009, demonstrates that intro-
ducing smart meters can be significantly delayed if the underlying legislation is 
flawed. In particular, the Dutch case shows that privacy is a crucial element in 
smart metering legislation. Energy consumption reveals details of personal life, 
in the most privacy-sensitive place – the home, and therefore smart metering 
has to strike a careful balance between detailed energy metering and privacy 
protection. 
In this paper, we present the recent developments in smart metering and de-
scribe the Dutch case in detail. From this, we draw key lessons for countries 
that want to introduce smart metering. In terms of substance, the level of detail 
of smart meter readings and the mandatory or voluntary character of smart me-
ters are crucial issues to take into account. Legislators must make a trade-off 
between the ‘smartness’ of the meter versus a comprehensive, mandatory roll-
out. In terms of procedure, a privacy impact assessment is vital, and pitfalls of 
function creep should be avoided by resisting the temptation of making a meter 
‘too smart’ all at once. From the outset, privacy and data protection law must be 
taken into account as an important requirement for the design of smart metering 
systems. 
 
Keywords: Smart metering, energy, privacy, data protection, Europe, the Neth-
erlands 
1 Introduction 
In 2009, the European Union enacted the Electricity Directive and the Natural Gas 
Directive.
1
 These directives recommend the implementation of smart metering sys-
tems, in order to promote energy efficiency and to help consumers in saving energy. 
If an economic assessment of the long-term costs and benefits to the markets and the 
individual consumers is positive, the Electricity Directive stipulates that at least 80 
per cent of consumers shall be equipped with smart meters by the year 2020.
2
 
The foreseen smart metering system has several functionalities, which are well 
captured in the following description: 
“a new generation of advanced and intelligent metering devices which have the 
ability to record the energy consumption of a particular measuring point in intervals 
of fifteen minutes or even less; communicate and transfer the information recorded in 
real time or at least on a daily basis by means of any communications network to the 
utility company; enable a two-way communication between the meter and the central 
system of the utility company, the so called distribution systems operator (DSO) al-




The implementation of smart metering at national levels can come in conflict with 
the legal framework regarding privacy and data protection. Energy consumption re-
veals details of personal life, in the most privacy-sensitive place – the home, and 
therefore smart metering has to strike a careful balance between detailed energy me-
tering and privacy protection. A relevant case in point is the Netherlands, where in 
2009, the First Chamber rejected two Smart Metering Bills because of privacy con-
cerns, significantly delaying the large-scale introduction of smart metering. The 
Dutch case shows that a privacy impact assessment is vital for the introduction of 
smart metering.  
In this paper, we present the recent developments in smart metering and describe 
the Dutch case, in order to draw lessons about assessing privacy compliance for coun-
tries that want to introduce smart metering. 
We will start in section 2 with a sketch of developments in smart grids and smart 
metering, as well as of the European legal framework regarding privacy and data 
protection. Next, in section 3, we present the Dutch case of smart metering, analyzing 
the privacy aspects of the first smart metering Bill that was rejected by the First 
Chamber and of the repair legislation that was subsequently adopted. We pay particu-
lar attention to a report that put the initial smart metering Bill to the privacy test of 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Based on the Dutch 
                                                          
1 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 con-
cerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC, OJ 14.08.2009, L211/55. Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natu-
ral gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ 14.08.2009, L211/94. 
2 Directive 2009/72/EC, Annex I, art. 2. 
3 Rainer Knyrim and Gerald Trieb, “Smart metering under EU Data Protection Law”, Interna-
tional Data Privacy Law, March 1, 2011, p. 121. 
case, we conclude in section 4 with a framework that can be used to assess the privacy 
implications of smart metering implementation.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Smart Grids and Smart Metering 
“Smart grids have an essential role in the process of transforming the functionality 
of the present electricity transmission and distribution grids so that they are able to 
provide a user-oriented service, supporting the achievement of the 20/20/20 targets 
and guaranteeing high security, quality and economic efficiency of electricity supply 




In 2009, the European Commission set up a Task Force Smart Grids to lay the 
foundations for smart grids in Europe. Its task is to identify and procure a set of regu-
latory recommendations to ensure EU-wide consistent and fast implementation of 
smart grids, while achieving all expected services and benefits for users.
5
 The Task 
Force consists of three Expert Groups, of which the first (EG1) will identify function-
alities of smart grids and smart meters. In their final report, a smart grid is defined as:  
“an electricity network that can cost efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions 
of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order 
to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high 
levels of quality and security of supply and safety”.
6
  
In contrast to traditional electricity networks, smart grids facilitate two-way energy 
traffic, enabling consumers with energy generators such as solar panels to transfer 
excess energy to the grid. Smart grids encompass a much wider area than smart me-
tering, but smart metering is an important first step towards a smart grid as they 
“bring intelligence to the ‘last mile’ between the grid and the final customer”.
7
 EG1 
even states that without this key element, the full potential of a smart grid will not be 
realized.
8
 The two-way energy traffic requires two-way communication with the grid 
both for billing purposes and for optimising energy efficiency. Another key function-
ality of smart meters is that they provide detailed feedback to consumers on their 
energy consumption, which raises awareness and should incite them to save energy 
where possible.  
                                                          
4 Task Force Smart Grids, Expert Group 1 (EG1), Functionalities of smart grids and smart 
meters, December 2010, p. 4. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/expert_group1.pdf.    
5 Knyrim and Trieb, p. 127. 
6 Task Force Smart Grids, Expert Group 1 (EG1), p. 6.    
7 Idem, p. 16.    
8 Idem.    
Smart metering standardization is covered by a specific Mandate (M/441) by the 
Commission to the European Standardization Organisations (ESOs).
9
 The work with-
in the M/441 Mandate is overseen by the Smart Meters Co-ordination Group 
(SMCG).
10
 The general objective of this mandate is: “To create European standards 
that will enable interoperability of utility meters (water, gas, electricity, heat) which 
can then improve the means by which customers’ awareness of actual consumption 
can be raised in order to allow timely adaptation in their demands”.
11
  
The legal framework regarding smart meters in Europe can be described as an on-
going process. The obligation to provide individual meters to end users was pre-
scribed in Directive 2006/32/EC on energy efficiency.
12
 This Directive is the basis of 
the initial proposals for the Dutch smart meters we discuss below. Although the Dutch 
proposals assumed that smart meters were mandatory to install, no such explicit obli-
gation can be derived from Directive 2006/32/EC. The Directive also does not pre-
scribe how specific the smart metering should be.  
In 2009, the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and the Natural Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC were adopted. These Directives prescribe smart meters in similar word-
ings as Directive 2006/32/EC: “In order to promote energy efficiency, Member States 
(...) shall strongly recommend that electricity undertakings optimise the use of elec-
tricity, for example by (...) introducing intelligent metering systems or smart grids, 
where appropriate”.
13
 Both Directives are supplemented with an Annex regarding 
measures on consumer protection. These Annexes include a requirement that at least 
80 per cent of consumers shall be equipped with smart meters by the year 2020, if an 
economic assessment by 3 September 2012 is positive.
14
 This assessment should de-
termine “all the long-term costs and benefits to the market and the individual con-
sumer or which form of intelligent metering is economically reasonable and cost-
effective”. A time-path of 10 years is foreseen for the implementation of intelligent 
metering systems. In the European Commission Digital Agenda for Europe the goal is 
                                                          
9 Standardization mandates can be retrieved from: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/standards_policy/mandates/database/ 
The three standardization Mandates relevant in view of the Smart Grids Task Force are 
Mandate M/490 for Smart Grids (issued 1 March 2011), Mandate M/468 for electric vehi-
cles (issued 4 June 2010) and Mandate M441 for smart meters (issued 12 March 2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/taskforce_en.htm 
10 Task Force Smart Grids, Expert Group 1 (EG1), , p. 5.    
11 Standardisation mandate to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of measuring instruments 
for the development of an open architecture for utility meters involving communication pro-
tocols enabling interoperability, p. 1,  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/2009_03_12_mandate_m441_en.p
df 
12 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union 
of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services and repealing Council Di-
rective 93/76/EEC, OJ 27.04.2006, L114/64. The latest date for implementation was 17 May 
2008. 
13 Art. 3(11) Directive 2009/72/EC; similarly, art. 3(8) Directive 2009/73/EC.  
14 Directive 2009/72/EC, Annex I, art. 2.  
set for the member states to agree on common additional functionalities for smart 
meters by the end of 2011.
15
 
In 2011, a new directive on energy efficiency was proposed that will repeal Direc-
tive 2006/32/EC.
16
 The explanatory memorandum concludes that smart meters have 
economic benefits: “Other options with a considerable positive impact compared to 
their costs are those that (...) provide improved and more frequent information to 
households and companies on their actual energy consumption through billing and 
smart meters (...). The [Impact Assessment] shows that all these measures are valu-
able in reducing the information gap that is one of the barriers to efficiency and could 
yield major energy savings”. Voluntary measures are considered insufficient to tap all 
the available potential for savings, hence the need for a revised directive.  
While the legal framework is still taking shape, smart meters have been developed 
and rolled out in several countries. The SmartRegions project published a European 
Smart Metering Landscape Report in February 2011. This report concludes that, due 
to a regulatory push by the EU’s Third Energy Market Package, a majority of Euro-
pean countries have or are about to implement some form of legal framework for the 
installation of smart meters.
17
 Some countries are labelled ‘dynamic movers' because 
they already have decided about a mandatory rollout, or major pilot projects are pav-
ing the way for such a decision.
18
 Besides the Netherlands, countries such as Den-
mark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK are 
‘dynamic movers.' A second category, comprised of Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovenia and Romania, is named ‘market drivers' where rollout is not based 
on legal requirements but on internal synergetic effects or because of customer de-
mands. Some countries are labelled ambiguous movers, as the debate is still ongoing 
without any clear decisions, such as Portugal, Belgium and Austria. The remaining 
member states are categorised as ‘waverers' and ‘laggards', as the debate on smart 
metering has not at all, or just yet, started.
19
  
2.2. European Legal Framework on Privacy and Data Protection  
Privacy can be seen as an umbrella concept, covering different dimensions of pri-
vate life. The territorial dimension relates e.g. to respect for the home, bodily integrity 
concerns the right to privacy in relation to the body, the right to choose which rela-
tionships to enter into is known as relational privacy, and informational privacy con-
                                                          
15 COM (2010) 245 final/2, 26.8.2010. 
16 Proposal for a Directive on energy efficiency and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC, COM(2011)370, 22.06.2011,  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/eed/eed_en.htm.  
For an elaborate description see: Steering through the maze #5. Your eceee guide to follow-
ing the approval process of the proposed Energy Efficiency Directive, 
http://www.eceee.org/EED.  
17 Stephan Renner et al., European Smart Metering Landscape Report SmartRegions Delivera-
ble 2.1., 2009, p. 1, http:// www.smartregions.net.   
18 Idem. 
19 See for a graph of these categories: http://www.smartregions.net/default.asp?SivuID=26927.  
cerns the protection of personal data. Because of the importance of data protection in 
current society, the concepts of privacy and data protection are often used as syno-
nyms, in a sense that people speak of privacy when they mean informational privacy 
or the protection of personal data. However, it is important to remember that privacy 
is a broader notion, encompassing more dimensions than just protection of personal 
data. This is captured in article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which covers the right to respect 
for private and family life, home and correspondence. This includes many aspects of 
data protection.
20
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes 
separate articles stipulating the right to private and family life, home and communica-
tions (art. 7) and the right to protection of personal data (art. 8).
21
  
Since smart meters potentially involve both personal data and private life, home 
and communications, they require a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. In the 
European context, the major legal instruments for such an assessment are the Data 





With regard to the informational privacy dimension, several legislative initiatives 
have been taken in Europe. Within the information society free flow of information is 
very important. Differences in national data protection legislation can hamper the 
internal market and from a human rights perspective a high level of protection is de-
sired to protect individuals’ personal data. These two pillars form the basis of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC, which stipulates the main rights and obligations to be respected when 
processing personal data.  
The Directive constitutes a layered system consisting of three levels. The first level 
is the general level that applies to every processing of personal data. The second level, 
which needs to be applied on top of the first level, applies when sensitive data are 
being processed. The third level is applicable when personal data are being transferred 
to third countries. Hence, if sensitive data are being transferred to third countries, all 
three levels apply.  
                                                          
20 Cf. Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, “Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg: Constitutionalization in Action”, In Reinventing Data Protection?, ed. Serge 
Gutwirth et al., (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 3-45.  
21 The Lisbon Treaty makes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights a binding and legally en-
forceable part of EU law, see http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm.  
For a downloadable copy of the Charter see: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/c_303/c_30320071214en00010016.pdf.  
22 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data,  OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50. The Directive has its roots in 
Convention 108 and the OECD privacy principles, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm  
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
First, it must be determined whether or not Directive 95/46/EC is applicable, on the 
basis of the first four articles of the Directive. The main questions to be answered are: 
are personal data being processed, i.e., ‘data relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person’ (data subject), and if so, whether an exception applies that makes the 
processing fall outside of the scope of the Directive.
23
 If the Directive applies, per-
sonal data “may only be processed fairly and lawfully’ (art. 6(a)). What this entails, 
can be derived from the other provisions in the Directive. The main aspects concern 
the requirement of a specified purpose for processing personal data, the requirement 
to have a legitimate basis for processing personal data, and the requirement only to 
process data in a way that is compatible with the specified purpose. Regarding the 
quality of the data it is determined that data must be relevant, accurate, not excessive 
and up to date. Besides, sufficient security measures need to be taken in order to pro-
tect data from being leaked, corrupted, or destroyed. Furthermore, the data controller 
(i.e., the one who determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data) has the obligation to inform data subjects (and in some cases the Data Protection 
Authority,
24
 art. 18) regarding data processing. Data subjects have the right to access, 
rectification, erasure, blocking, and the right to object to data processing. The Direc-
tive obliges Member States to put in place effective sanctioning mechanisms.  
The second level lays down an extra strict regime for the processing of sensitive 
data, being data ‘revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or phi-
losophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning 
health or sex life’ (art. 8). Even though on the surface this prohibition might not seem 
relevant in view of smart meter data, examples can be given where these data do pro-
vide an insight into, e.g., religious beliefs, as energy consumption can reveal patterns 
of, for example, observing Ramadan or getting ready for morning prayers. 
The third level of the Directive concerns the transfer of data to third countries, 
which is only allowed if the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection 
(art. 25-26). This is not immediately relevant for smart metering, except if suppliers 
outsource their data processing to non-EU countries or to the cloud.  
Besides the general provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, there are also some sector-
specific rules and regulations, such as Directive 2002/58/EC and Directive 
                                                          
23 See art. 3: ‘(1) This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly or partly 
by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal 
data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. (2) 
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: 
in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those 
provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to proc-
essing operations concerning public security, defence, State security (including the eco-
nomic well-being of the State when the processing operation relates to State security mat-
ters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law; [or] by a natural person in the 
course of a purely personal or household activity.’ 
24 The Directive obliges all Member States to establish a supervisory authority, also known as 
Data Protection Authority. 
2006/24/EC which apply to electronic communications.
25
 These Directives could play 
a role when electronic communications services are used for data processing in smart 
metering systems.
26
 These services might, depending on the technologies used and the 
specifications of the system, process not only personal data but also location data. An 
analysis of these Directives in relation to smart metering is beyond the scope of this 
paper; we recommend further research into the applicability of Directive 2002/58/EC 
to smart metering and, if it applies, into the consequences of this legal regime for 
smart metering systems. 
Finally, the general and specific legislation is supplemented by sector-specific soft 
law, such as codes of conduct. Such supplementary instruments need to be taken into 
account as it can influence upon whether and how data may be processed. In the case 
of smart metering, the underlying contracts between consumers and energy suppliers 
can contain specific provisions regarding whether and how personal data may be 
processed. 
2.2.2 Proposed Regulation for data protection 
On Data Protection Day 2012, a Proposal was presented for a new EU General Da-
ta Protection Regulation.
27
 There is no scope in this paper for elaborate reflection on 
the consequences of this proposal, since it is a draft that will be much debated and 
possibly amended in the coming years, and the large-scale roll-out of smart metering 
may take place prior to the entry into force of the proposed changes. Moreover, a 
substantial part of the Regulation clarifies and harmonizes existing concepts, rights 
and obligations of the current EU legal framework on data protection. Some important 
new rights are proposed, such as the right to be forgotten and a right to data portabil-
                                                          
25 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic com-
munications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002, p. 37–47. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communica-
tions networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 54–63. 
26 The definition of an electronic communications service is: ‘a service normally provided for 
remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services 
in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial 
control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it 
does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC, 
which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communi-
cations networks’ (art. 2(c) Directive 2002/21/EC, OJ L108/33, 24.4.2002).  
27 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), Brussels, 25.1.2012 COM (2012) 11 final 
2012/0011 (COD). Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.  
 
ity (art. 17 and 18). For smart metering, two new obligations can be considered most 
relevant. Article 23 of the proposed Regulation introduces the principle of privacy by 
design and default. Establishing an obligation for the controller to implement appro-
priate technical and organisational measures and procedures to meet the requirements 
of the Regulation and to ensure the protection of data subject rights. These mecha-
nisms must ensure by default that only those personal data are processed which are 
necessary for each specific purpose of the processing and are especially not collected 
or retained beyond the minimum necessary for those purposes.  
 
In article 33 the popular notion of Data protection impact assessment (also known 
as PIA, Privacy Impact Assessment) is introduced. If data processing operations pre-
sent specific risks, controllers must carry out an assessment of the impact of the en-
visaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. Several situations 
are mentioned, including “a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects 
relating to a natural person or for analysing or predicting in particular the natural 
person's economic situation, location, health, personal preferences, reliability or 
behaviour, which is based on automated processing and on which measures are based 
that produce legal effects concerning the individual or significantly affect the individ-
ual” (art. 33, section 2, under a).  
 
As will be discussed in section 4.1, smart metering data can offer sharp insights into 
our daily lives. Therefore, under the proposed new EU legal framework, the introduc-
tion of smart metering systems will require not only privacy by design and by default, 
but also a Data protection impact assessment prior to the implementation of such a 
system.
28
 This is a development to which the developers of smart metering systems 
should adapt in any case, as will become clear from the Dutch smart metering case in 
section 3.    
 
2.2.3. The triple test of art. 8 ECHR 
As explained above, processing personal data according to data protection legisla-
tion is no guarantee that privacy will not be infringed. In smart metering, the conse-
quences of data processing go beyond the informational privacy dimension, as insight 
can be given into patterns of living, at what times of the day and days of the week 
someone is at home or away, how many people make up the household, and inciden-
tal and structural changes in these patterns over time. If smart metering comes with 
supply regulation functions, for example if energy supply can be reduced or com-
pletely cut off through the meter, there can even be a restriction in a primary necessity 
of life, which can constitute an invasion of privacy as well. 
                                                          
28 Conducting a PIA is also a core recommendation in the NIST Guidelines for Smart Grid 
Cyber Security: Vol. 2, Privacy and the Smart Grid, NISTIR 7628, August 2010. Available 
from: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol2.pdf. 
For European countries, article 8 ECHR is the most important codification of the 
fundamental human right to privacy. A significant body of case-law helps to apply art. 
8 ECHR to new cases and developments. Therefore, a privacy test can best be con-
ducted along the lines of Article 8 ECHR. This article states: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
 
The text of article 8 displays a triple test regarding whether or not the right to pri-
vacy is invaded. For smart metering, this test translates into the following four ques-
tions:  
1. Does the smart meter interfere with privacy? If so, the next questions must be 
answered. 
2. Is the infringement in accordance with the law?  
3. Does the infringement serve any of the interests mentioned in art. 8(2)?  
4. Is the infringement necessary in a democratic society?  
 
Although the first three questions can usually be answered rather easily in respect 
of smart metering,
29
 the fourth question requires to check whether the infringement of 
privacy caused by the smart metering system is necessary in view of a pressing social 
need, relevant to meet its purpose, does not go beyond what is necessary to meet its 
purpose, and whether there are no less invasive alternatives to meet its purpose (sub-
sidiarity) and its benefits are in a reasonable proportion to the costs (proportionality). 
This is not easy to assess in general as this closely depends on the specific implemen-
tation of smart metering, e.g., whether or not a smart meter is mandatory, the purposes 
for which it is implemented, and the functionalities that will be given to the smart 
metering system.   
                                                          
29 See also Paul de Hert and Dariusz Kloza, “The challenges to privacy and data protection  
posed by smart grids”, In Europäische Projektkultur als Beitrag zur Rationalisierung des 
Rechts, ed. E. Schweighofer and F. Kummer (Wien, 2011), 194. 
3. The Dutch Case
30
  
3.1. The 2008 smart metering bills 
The introduction of smart meters was envisioned by the Netherlands in 2006, with 
a view to ensuring the smooth operation of the retail energy market.
31
 The introduc-
tion was also a consequence of the compulsory implementation of the Directive on 
energy efficiency.
32
 This Directive, whose primary aim is to bring about energy sav-
ings, prescribes that end users should have energy meters that provide information 
about actual use. End users must also regularly receive information about this use. 
To ensure timely implementation of the Directive, it was decided that this would 
take place in two stages. The transposition of the Directive would take place in the 
Implementation of the EC Directives on Energy Efficiency Bill. This bill was submit-
ted to the Second Chamber in January 2008.
33
 When another bill, amending the Elec-
tricity Act 1998 and Gas Act to improve the operation of the electricity and gas mar-
kets,
34
 would enter into force, the provisions with respect to electricity and gas from 
the Implementation Bill would lapse.   
Together, these two smart metering bills provided for the mandatory introduction 
of so-called smart meters in every Dutch household. Not accepting the installation of 
a smart meter was made punishable as an economic offence, sanctioned with a fine of 
up to 17,000 euro or imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months. The smart meter 
would record and forward to the network operators (also called grid managers) data 
about consumers’ energy consumption at detailed interval periods, namely hourly 
measurements for gas and quarter-hourly measurements for electricity. These data 
would be forwarded to the energy suppliers, who would then use these data to provide 
consumers with detailed information about their energy consumption, so that the con-
sumers could adapt their energy-consuming behaviour accordingly.  
Besides the measuring and communication functionalities, the initial Dutch pro-
posals also included signaling, switching and regulatory functions. The signaling 
function enables the network operator to detect energy quality remotely. The switch-
ing function enables network operators to remotely switch energy capacity off and on, 
in order to deal with fraudulent or non-paying customers, or in case of disasters. Fi-
                                                          
30  For the complete parliamentary history of the Dutch implementation of Directive 
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nally, the regulatory function entails the possibility to add options to the meter so that 
it can carry out additional supportive functions.
35
 
Since some privacy concerns were raised after the 31374 Bill had been submitted 
to parliament, the Dutch Data Protection Authority (DDPA)
36
 was asked to advise on 
the Bill. The DDPA deemed the initial proposal for the Dutch smart metering act to 
violate the Dutch Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens). Their 
main concerns related to a lack of consent or any other legitimate processing ground 
and obscurities regarding which parties have access to what measuring data.
37
 The 
Minister of Economic Affairs amended the proposal by providing that the network 
operator could only transfer the hourly or quarter-hourly readings of energy consump-
tion to energy suppliers if consumers have given explicit consent for this; daily read-
ings would, however, still be mandatorily forwarded to energy suppliers. The Minister 
also emphasised that all conditions of chapter 2 of the Dutch DPA would apply, in-
cluding the requirements of purpose specification and use limitation, data subjects’ 
right of access, data removal after use, and suitable security measures. After the 
amendment, the Dutch Data Protection Authority deemed the legislation compliant 
with the Dutch Data Protection Act. Reassured by the amendments, in July 2008, the 




3.2. Privacy assessment report 
As data protection is only one dimension of the broader right to privacy, the Dutch 
Consumer Union was not convinced that all privacy concerns had been addressed. 
After the bills had been passed by the Second Chamber, the Consumer Union com-
missioned a study to test whether the proposed smart metering legislation was in con-




The report observed that the generation of quarter-hourly/hourly and daily readings 
from which information can be derived about lifestyles and the presence or absence 
and numbers of persons, along with the compulsory use of smart meters that generate 
detailed readings and pass them on to grid managers, as well as the imposition of a 
severe security obligation on grid managers, are aspects of the bill that infringe pri-
vacy. Smart meters put pressure not only on informational privacy, but also on the 
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right to inviolability of the home and the right to respect for family life. For these 
reasons, the report performed a strict privacy-compliance test as laid down in art. 8 
ECHR. 
The report concluded that the following characteristics of the proposed Dutch 
smart metering system were not (proven to be) necessary in a democratic society: the 
generation and passing on of quarter-hourly/hourly readings to grid managers; the 
daily readings to grid managers and suppliers; and the compulsory roll-out of smart 
meters to all households. Therefore, the report concluded that the introduction of the 
smart meter on these points would violate article 8 of the ECHR.  
Moreover, the report found that the government had provided too little evidence to 
assess the necessity of building in a switching function that would enable capacity to 
be switched on and off remotely, and a signalling function for combating fraud. To 
meet the test of article 8, more empirical evidence should be provided about the 
prevalence of energy fraud, to substantiate the necessity of building in these function-
alities for all consumers. After all, these functionalities introduce new opportunities of 
abuse, e.g., by malevolent hackers, and thus constitute a security and privacy risk.  
The main reason for these conclusions was that the bills, particularly the points 
concerning detailed metering data and compulsory use, provide insufficient substan-
tiation as to why these steps would be necessary in a democratic society. It is not clear 
whether it would actually foster energy savings – the primary purpose of the Directive 
– if consumers have to consult their energy consumption on a website provided by 
their supplier or a third party; it could be equally or more effective if consumers con-
sult their real-time energy use on a display in the house itself, without meter readings 
having to leave the privacy of the home. In as far as the smart meter was intended to 
increase efficiency, this aim could be achieved by the proposal, but this is not a press-
ing social need. There are alternatives that entail less invasive infringements of pri-
vacy, again meters with in-home displays can be mentioned, as well as the use of 
statistical and anonymised data, which might also effectively serve the intended aims. 
These alternatives had not been sufficiently researched, meaning that the compulsory 
introduction of smart meters did not meet the requirements of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. With the bills, insufficient consideration had been given to the fact that the 
smart meter is a measure that constitutes a significant breach of the right to inviolabil-
ity of the home and the right to respect for family life. To justify such a breach, much 
more substantiation with convincing arguments and empirical data was required. In 
the absence thereof, so the report concluded, the proposal in its current form would 
therefore have to be rejected. 
The report recommended to study suitable alternatives that would infringe privacy 
to a lesser extent while still contributing to achieve the intended objectives. With 
respect to installing the switching and signalling functions, additional empirical re-
search could be performed to determine whether these need to be introduced on a 
large scale. 
  
3.3. Rejection by the First Chamber  
The Dutch First Chamber discussed the privacy concerns that had been raised by 
the report and by criticisms that had been voiced in the media. Senators voiced criti-
cism that an ex ante assessment of art. 8 ECHR had not been conducted, observing 
that the Dutch DPA had only looked at compliance with the Dutch Data Protection 
Act, and they questioned the Dutch additions to the requirements of the Directive, in 
the detailed readings of the meter that had to be provided to the network operator and 
(in daily measurements) to the energy supplier, which consumers could not opt out of. 
The Senate was not convinced by the Minister’s argumentation that art. 8 ECHR was 
not violated by the proposal. Most importantly, the Senate was particularly alarmed 
by the mandatory character of the roll-out, and by the far-reaching sanction of 6 
months’ imprisonment for consumers refusing to have a smart meter installed. There-
fore, on April 7 2009, the First Chamber decided not to accept the proposed legisla-
tion unless it were changed in several respects.
40
 Constitutionally, the First Chamber 
can only accept or reject bills, but not amend them. In cases like this, the First Cham-
ber can – under threat of rejecting a bill altogether – induce a minister to promise to 
introduce a new bill, called a ‘novella’ (novelle), in the Second Chamber that amends 
the bill at issue. This construction allows the First Chamber to accept the original bill 
as it will be amended by the novelle.  
3.4. The 2010 novelles 
The novelles (one for each bill) were introduced in the spring of 2010.
41
 Four 
changes were implemented by the novelles that are relevant in view of privacy. Two 
have only minor privacy implications. First, a so-called supply model (Leveranciers-
model) was introduced, i.e., a system where end users no longer receive separate bills 
from the grid manager and the energy supplier. With the introduction of the supply 
model they only receive one combined bill from their energy supplier. This change is 
relevant in view of privacy as this change creates coherence between the administra-
tive processes of grid operators, energy suppliers, and measuring companies regarding 
the management of end-user data.  
A second minor improvement for privacy is the duty for the energy sector to ad-
dress in their annual reports how they have dealt with the requirements regarding data 
processing. Although it does not enhance the level of privacy as such, it does improve 
transparency and awareness.  
A major change enhancing the privacy-friendliness of the Dutch smart metering 
landscape concerns cancelling the obligatory roll-out of smart meters. The novelles 
explicitly grant end users the right to refuse a smart meter, without risking a fine or 
imprisonment, as the sanction is lifted. Besides declining a smart meter, consumers 
are offered a possibility to request the operator to ‘administratively shut down’ the 
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smart meter. This means that a grid operator will stop reading measuring data of an 
end user. A grid operator is legally obliged to honour this request.  
A second considerable improvement for privacy is a clarification and codification 
of the terms and conditions under which personal data can be processed by the parties 
involved in the process of energy supply. The collection of end-user metering data by 
the grid manager and energy suppliers is now explicitly tied to their legally prescribed 
tasks, such as billing by suppliers and network management by the grid operator. This 
is a refinement of the rules regarding the processing of measuring data. Previously, 
only the conditions under which grid operators were allowed to transfer measuring 
data of end users to suppliers were laid down. The conditions now in place regarding 
the collection and use of such data by grid operators provide more checks and bal-
ances to protect the privacy of consumers.  
Dutch Parliament was satisfied with the privacy improvement of making the smart 
meters voluntary. The Second Chamber passed the novelles in November 2010 and 
the First Chamber accepted the original smart metering bills, including the amend-
ments made by the novelles, in February 2011.
42
 
3.5. Privacy re-assessment  
The new Dutch smart metering legislation has clearly responded to the privacy 
concerns that were one of the main reasons for the First Chamber to reject the earlier 
proposals. The current Dutch legislation can be described as a four-choice-model, as 
end users/customers are in a position to choose between four options to measure their 
energy consumption.  
1. No smart meter, hold on to the traditional (‘stupid’) meter. 
2. A smart meter that can be administratively shut down. 
3. A smart meter with a standard measurement regime. 
4. A smart meter for which explicit consent is given to read out more data than 
is allowed under the standard measurement regime.
43
  
Not only the possibility to decline a smart meter is a step towards a more privacy-
friendly system, also the fact that grid operators are not allowed to collect a continu-
ous stream of measuring data certainly is an improvement for privacy.
44
 In the stan-
dard measurement regime, only the following data are allowed to be processed: once 
a year for the annual invoice; at an intermediate time in case of relocation of the end 
user or if the end user switches from one energy supplier to another; bi-monthly for an 
insight into the actual energy consumption; and, finally, all data processing that is 
relevant for technical management and necessary in view of the legal obligations for 
grid operators. Data processing thus is also allowed to check for the proper and secure 
functioning of meters. Moreover, legislation stipulates that grid operators may only 
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transfer data to energy suppliers that are necessary in view of the suppliers’ tasks.
45
 
Hence, daily measurements no longer form part of the standard measurement regime. 
More frequent and detailed readings of metering data are only permitted if end users 
have given their unambiguous consent. This consent can be withdrawn at any time 
without negative consequences for the end user.
46
 
Although the scope of this paper does not allow us to assess in-depth the amended 
legislation’s compliance with art. 8 ECHR, for the moment we incline to thinking that 
the Dutch law is now more in line with privacy requirements. Important factors are 
that very detailed regular readings are no longer part of the standard measurement 
regime and that consumers have the right to refuse a smart meter. This significantly 
reduces the infringement of individuals’ privacy.  
There is one caveat, however, in that Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC fore-
see a mandatory 80% coverage if a cost/benefit analysis is positive for a member 
state. According to the Minister, five factors will be taken into account: how often 
consumers switch to other (presumably more cost-efficient) energy suppliers, the roll-
out percentage, roll-out efficiency, the costs of distance-readable meters, and energy 
savings by consumers. All factors will be closely monitored during the initial small-
scale and subsequent large-scale roll-out.
47
 The caveat is that the cost/benefit assess-
ment could turn out positive while less than 80% of consumers accept smart meters. 
In that case, pressure could be put on unwilling consumers to accept a smart meter 
after all, jeopardising the voluntary nature of the roll-out. One could question whether 
a mandatory 80% roll-out target (conditional upon a cost/benefit analysis) is neces-
sary in a democratic society, if a member state bases its art. 8 ECHR compliance on 
voluntary smart metering. However that may be, the abolition of very detailed read-
ings – which is the main privacy-sensitive issue in smart metering – in the standard 
measurement regime, with consumers having to give unambiguous consent if quarter-
hourly or hourly readings are to be transferred to operators or suppliers, seem to take 
the largest privacy sting out of the Dutch law.  
4. Lessons for Assessing the Privacy Aspects of Smart Metering 
From the Dutch smart metering case, two factors can be highlighted as having been 
predominant in the rejection of the smart metering bills by the First Chamber: 1) the 
very detailed readings of smart meters and the transfer of these readings from con-
sumer to grid operator and (of less but still) detailed readings from operator to energy 
supplier; 2) the compulsory nature of the roll-out, sanctioned by a hefty fine or even 
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imprisonment. Compounding these factors, two other aspects can be highlighted as 
underlying the problematic introduction of smart metering legislation: 3) a lack of 
substantiation why the privacy infringement and the compulsory roll-out were neces-
sary; 4) the combination of different functionalities in one smart meter, creating a 
complex hybrid involving new risks and also confusing the argumentation for the 
necessity of such a smart metering system. In this section, we will discuss these fac-
tors in some more detail.  
4.1. The level of details of meter readings 
Smart metering data can offer sharp insights into our daily lives. The intensity of 
this vision ‘through the walls of our home’ becomes clear from several recent studies. 
Molina-Markham et al. indicate that it is possible to extract complex usage patterns 
from smart meter data: knowledge of an appliance’s power signature enables identify-
ing individual appliance usage within the aggregate data of a smart meter. Future data 
mining will likely enable even more refined identification of appliances, such as par-
ticular brands or models
48
 Quinn points out that the privacy issue is all the more im-
portant as smart meters enable real-time monitoring of energy consumption.
49
 Elabo-
rating on this research, Greveler et al. show that smart meter data, when measured in 
intervals of 4 hours, exactly reveal when a person is at home, when he is sleeping and 
when he is preparing his meals. When using shorter intervals, of minutes or seconds, 
electric devices can be identified on the basis of use profiles, such as a fridge, coffee 
machine, washing machine, toaster, microwave, and TV.
50
 These data can reveal if 
someone eats a cold or a hot breakfast, when laundry is done, or whether the kids are 
alone at home. It is even possible to determine which channel a TV is tuned to, 
through an analysis of the broadcast programs, particularly if the TV is tuned to a 
longer program such as a movie. The interfering noise in the meter data of other ener-
gy-consuming devices can most likely be filtered out in case movies are watched of 
90 minutes or longer.
51
 
This demonstrates that the more detailed smart meters readings are, the more pri-
vacy-sensitive the data become. Real-time readings in intervals of minutes can reveal 
many details of home life and paint a disturbingly clear picture of people’s behaviour 
and preferences. Quarter-hourly or hourly measurements also reveal a rather privacy-
sensitive picture, showing behaviour patterns and perhaps some insight in the type of 
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household appliances used. While daily readings are less privacy-sensitive, they are 
still relevant from a privacy perspective, as they reveal patterns of being at home or 
away from home, and the number of people at home on a specific day. Here, privacy 
risks go hand-in-hand with security risks, threatening the inviolability of the home, as 
would-be burglars could determine on the basis of smart meter data when residents 
are away from home, and even whether or not they have an electronic security sys-
tem.
52
 More in general, security risks of smart metering systems emerge from auto-
mated two-way communication relationships with heterogeneous partners, requiring 
strong authentication and authorisation mechanisms to secure the transfer of smart 
meter data.
53
   
The lesson here is that smart meters in today’s homes not only measure the amount 
of energy consumption, but also have great potential to reveal what people do when, 
within the sanctity of their home. The more detailed the readings, the more privacy-
sensitive the data become. This is a major factor to take into account when deciding 
which measurements have to be transferred from smart meters to network operators 
and energy suppliers. Privacy-sensitive data – such as quarter-hourly or hourly read-
ings but also daily readings – should probably be processed only within the house 
itself (e.g., in an in-home display that enables consumers to monitor their energy con-
sumption in real time). If detailed measurements are necessary to transfer outside of 
the home, a very high level of information security must be provided, and compelling 
reasons must be provided to do so in light of art. 8 ECHR’s requirement of ‘necessity 
in a democratic society’.  
4.2. Mandatory or voluntary roll-out 
The largest stumbling block in the Dutch case was the mandatory nature of the roll-
out. It was foreseen that every household would receive a smart meter over the course 
of a few years, and consumers could not refuse. The smart meter bills included a pro-
vision that refusing a smart meter would count as an economic offence, which could 
be sanctioned with up to six months’ detention. Although the Minister said in the First 
Chamber that she would deal with this ‘in a practical way’, she did not exclude the 
possibility that network operators would denounce a consumer’s refusal with the po-
lice and that the Public Prosecutor would then decide how to deal with this economic 
offence.
54
 The combination of mandatory roll-out and the threat of a very serious – 
indeed, disproportionate – sanction for people who did not want a privacy-infringing 
smart meter was too much for the bill to survive.  
The proposed new Directive on energy efficiency
55
 does not seem to require a 
mandatory roll-out of smart meters. Article 8(1) rather suggests voluntary acceptance 
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of smart meters by end users: “Member States shall ensure that final customers (...) 
are provided with individual meters that accurately measure and allow to make avail-
able their actual energy consumption and provide information on actual time of use” 
(emphasis added). It is questionable that should be interpreted as an obligation on 
end-users to accept the smart individual meter; the wording suggests they should be 
provided with the opportunity. Article 8(1) moreover clarifies that certain functional-
ities are only triggered on request of the final customer: “In the case of electricity and 
on request of the final customer, meter operators shall ensure that the meter can ac-
count for electricity produced on the final customer's premises and exported to the 
grid. Member States shall ensure that if final customers request it, metering data on 
their real-time production or consumption is made available to a third party acting on 
behalf of the final customer” (emphasis added). 
High-frequency interval periods for measurements such as those proposed in the 
initial Dutch bills are not required on the basis of Annex VI of the proposed Directive. 
For billing purposes, monthly measurements are foreseen for Electricity and bi-
monthly measurements for Gas. For private data exported through the interface to the 
end user – to better control their energy consumption – the end user must be offered 
the possibility to consult her historic consumption levels in the last seven days, day by 
day. This requires daily measurements. However, the Annex does not require such 
data to be exported outside of the house: it only requires secured transport of these 
data from the meter to the end user. For meters placed within a house, an in-home 
display would therefore suffice to show these daily measurements. Moreover, addi-
tional information allowing for more detailed self-checks by customers, such as 
graphic evolutions of consumption and benchmarking information) should be pro-
vided to customers according to Annex VI, but these do not require more detailed 
than daily readings and these should be accessible to customers “either directly 
through the interface or via the internet”. Hence, the smart meter that seems mandated 
by the proposed Directive is therefore restricted to one that is capable of at least daily 
measurements and that has an interface showing readings to the customer. Additional 
functionality or more detailed readings are not required for a roll-out of smart meters.  
This suggests that if countries want to introduce ‘smarter’ meters than those re-
quired by the Directive – particularly if they entail more detailed readings or involve 
high-frequency transfer of readings to network operators or suppliers – this requires 
consent of the end users. Knyrim and Trieb, however, have argued that user consent is 
not necessarily the only possible legal basis for  installing smart meters.
56
  
“The legitimacy of [smart meter data] transfers has to be based, for example, on a 
broad interpretation of Articles 7(b) and 7(f) of the Data Protection Directive
57
. Nev-
ertheless, taking into account that (according to almost all academic studies carried 
out so far) the rollout of new metering technology is economically feasible only if the 
vast majority of households is furnished with a smart meter, the establishment of a 
                                                          
56 Knyrim and Trieb, p. 122. 
57 Art. 7(b) refers to execution of a contract and 7(f) to legitimate interests of the data processor 
that outweigh the privacy interest of data subjects [authors’ footnote]. 
valid legal obligation, either at the European or national level, might serve as the 
clearest, safest, and most sustainable way of securing successful implementation.”
58
 
Basically, these authors argue that there is a pressing social need for rolling-out 
smart meters to a large majority of households, and hence that national legislation 
mandating end users to accept smart meters would therefore pass the test of art. 8 
ECHR. We are not immediately convinced by this argument, first because it requires 
careful analysis of the studies into the economic aspects of smart metering (something 
that is lacking in Knyrim and Trieb’s article itself), and second because economic 
arguments are not necessarily strong enough to outweigh privacy interests. Whether 
legislation mandating smart meters is art. 8 ECHR-compliant will depend on how 
privacy-infringing they are and on how convincingly a legislator demonstrates that, in 
the context of the particular country, the economic arguments favouring a comprehen-
sive roll-out of mandatory meters are indeed sufficiently pressing.  
For the time being, it seems that European law in itself does not require mandatory 
smart meters, except for a minimum functionality of daily readings and direct acces-
sibility of these readings to end users, which can be fulfilled through in-home dis-
plays. This lays a significant burden of proof on countries that want to roll-out 
‘smarter’ meters than the European minimum on a mandatory basis, to show a ‘press-
ing social need’
59
 for this. The experience of the Dutch case suggests it might be a 
safer strategy to start with a voluntary roll-out and then to closely monitor how the 
factors evolve that are relevant for assessing the societal costs and benefits of smart 
meters.  
4.3. Two underlying problems 
Although the Dutch case ostensibly revolved around the level of detail of meas-
urements and the mandatory character of the meter, two more general problems can 
be identified that lay beneath the initial legislative failure.  
The first problem is a significant underestimation of the importance of privacy. 
The drafters of the initial smart metering bills and the Second Chamber focused al-
most exclusively on the economic and environmental aspects of smart grids and smart 
meters. No privacy impact assessment had been made. Only when the Dutch Con-
sumer Association pointed out possible privacy concerns to the Minister, did she re-
quest the Data Protection Authority to advise on the Bills. When some adjustments 
had been made following the DPA’s advice, the Second Chamber was easily satisfied 
with the privacy compliance of the smart metering legislation. Throughout this entire 
process, art. 8 ECHR was overlooked. Only when the privacy assessment report 
commissioned by the Consumer Association was drafted, did parliamentarians be-
come aware that privacy is more than just compliance with the national Data Protec-
tion Act. The fact that smart meters have the capacity to reveal quite privacy-sensitive 
information, thus affecting not only informational privacy but also privacy of the 
home and of family life, seems to have been disregarded until the First Chamber, 
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armoured with the privacy assessment report, started questioning the Minister about 
this. A tell-tale sign of privacy misapprehensions was a complete confusion in the 
First Chamber discussion whether the Dutch DPA had advised on the basis of compli-
ance with the Dutch Data Protection Act or whether it had checked compliance with 
art. 8 ECHR. While the Minister initially stated the latter had been the case, subse-
quently it became clear that it had been the former.
60
  
Perhaps because the privacy implications of smart meters had been underestimated, 
the argumentation for the very detailed readings and the mandatory roll-out had been 
superficial. An important element of the privacy impact assessment report was that 
the need for such mandatory ‘smartness’ had not been substantiated; many claims 
suffered from a lack of empirical evidence, such as the claim that consumers would 
become more energy-saving if they received information about their energy consump-
tion from an energy supplier on a website.  
The lesson to draw here is not only that privacy implications, of course, should 
never be underestimated, but also that an ex ante assessment of privacy implications 
can help to prevent legislative proposals from stumbling over privacy concerns further 
down the line. Countries considering smart metering legislation should conduct a 
privacy impact assessment, carefully analysing the privacy implications, and substan-
tiating where appropriate, based on empirical evidence, how and why privacy in-
fringements are deemed necessary in a democratic society. An important element of 
such a privacy impact assessment is looking at alternatives that are less privacy-
invasive but that still serve the intended purposes of smart metering.  
 
The second problem underlying the Dutch case is function creep – the expanding 
of functionality beyond the original purpose. While the European legislation required 
smart meters to provide feedback to end users, thus helping them to become more 
energy-saving, the Dutch bills added several functionalities to the proposed smart 
meter. Apart from providing information to consumers for energy-saving purposes, 
smart meters also had to provide distance-readable measurements to monitor network 
functioning and to combat fraud. Moreover, the meter also had to be controllable at a 
distance to regulate energy delivery, both for fraud-combating and disaster-
management purposes.
61
 The combination of all these functionalities led to a smart 
meter with a potential of very high frequency of two-way traffic between the meter 
and the grid. The transfer of very detailed measurements to the network operator, and 
daily measurements to energy suppliers, fitted well in the picture of such a hybrid 
smart meter, leading to a neglect of privacy-friendly alternatives, such as in-home 
displays or aggregation of individual meter data in the grid, that could likely equally 
well have served the purposes of energy-saving or network management. Also, the 
legitimate need for combating fraud, which can be served well by smart meters, does 
                                                          
60 See Parliamentary Proceedings First Chamber, 24 March 2009, 26-1329, 26-1349f; 7 April 
2009, 28-1416.  
61 In Italy, the introduction of smart metering by ENEL was strongly driven by the desire to 
combat fraud. See in this respect: Rob van Gerwen, Saskia Jaarsma and Rob Wilhite, Smart 
Metering, KEMA, The Netherlands, July 2006. Available from: http://www.idc-
online.com/technical_references/pdfs/electrical_engineering/Smart_Metering.pdf. 
not necessarily imply that comprehensive, wide-scale processing of detailed meter 
readings is necessary to identify occasional illegal activity.
62
  
The lesson here is that smart meters have a wide range of functionalities,
63
 which 
harbours a risk that too many functions are combined in a smart meter in a way that 
makes privacy implications less visible or less weighty in the overall assessment of 
the need for a smart meter.
64
 This can backfire if the privacy assessment of a resulting 
hybrid smart meter concludes that the smart meter as a whole, with all its functional-
ities, is economically necessary, while disregarding whether privacy infringements are 
really necessary in light of each separate purpose. In other words, countries proposing 
complex smart meters with many functionalities may tend to overlook that simple 
purposes, such as inducing consumers to become more energy-saving or peak-load 
reduction in network management, can also be achieved by privacy-friendly alterna-
tives.  
5. Conclusion 
The future of energy supply lies in smart grids, which enable not only energy sup-
ply to consumers but also energy supply from consumers. These two-way energy 
networks require smart energy metering systems. The vision of truly smart grids will 
require one or more decades yet to be fully realised, but since a roll-out of smart me-
ters is a lengthy process, countries are already starting to implement smart metering 
legislation, following the European legal framework on energy efficiency. Rolling out 
smart meters, however, requires smart legislation. The Dutch case, where the Senate 
blocked two smart metering bills in 2009, demonstrates that introducing smart meters 
can be significantly delayed if the underlying legislation if flawed.  
More in particular, the Dutch case shows that privacy is not to be underestimated. 
The failure of doing an ex ante privacy impact assessment backfired, as the proposed 
laws required mandatory installation in every household of smart meters that would 
send quarter-hourly/hourly measurements to network operators and daily measure-
ments to energy suppliers. This level of detail creates privacy-sensitive data, and the 
necessity of smart meters infringing people’s privacy in this way had not been sub-
stantiated by the government.  
Several lessons can be learned from the Dutch case for countries considering smart 
metering legislation. In terms of substance, the level of detail of smart meter readings 
and the mandatory or voluntary character of smart meters are crucial issues to take 
                                                          
62 Cf. Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 12/2011 on smart metering”, WP 183, April 4, 2011: 
21.  
63 For an overview see: Smart Meters Co-ordination Group (SMCG), Standardization mandate 
to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of measuring instruments for the develop-ment of 
an open architecture for utility meters involving communication protocols enabling Interop-
erability M/441, FINAL REPORT 2009,  http://www.piio.pl/dok/SMCG_Sec0013_DC.pdf.  
64 The addition of extra functionalities over and above the requirements of the European Direc-
tives was also an issue for the First Chamber in questioning the acceptability of the smart 
metering bills. See, e.g. Parliamentary Proceedings First Chamber, 24 March 2009, 26-1325. 
into account. In terms of procedure, a privacy impact assessment is vital to identify at 
an early stage the potential effects on individuals’ privacy and to choose the least 
privacy-infringing modalities of smart metering. Pitfalls of function creep should be 
avoided by resisting the temptation of making a meter ‘too smart’ all at once, which 
could easily lead, as the Dutch case demonstrates, to choosing privacy-invasive in-
stead of privacy-friendly settings; such settings are unnecessary to achieve the pri-
mary purpose of the current European energy-efficiency regulation, namely to provide 
consumers with sufficient feedback on their energy consumption to induce energy-
saving behaviour.  
The procedural lessons also highlight the need for privacy by design. This principle 
concerns the need to integrate, at practical level, data protection and privacy from the 
very inception of new information and communication technologies.
65
 The purpose, 
design, functionalities and implementation of the smart metering system determines to 
a large extent whether or not it will comply with privacy and data protection legisla-
tion. Therefore, from the beginning, privacy and data protection law must be taken 
into account as an important requirement for the design of smart metering systems.
66
 
It is a promising development that the proposed Regulation on data protection explic-
itly establishes obligations for privacy by design and default, and an ex ante obliga-




The substantive lessons can also be formulated in the form of a key trade-off for 
legislators: the ‘smartness’ of the meter versus a comprehensive, mandatory roll-out. 
The smarter a meter is, i.e., the more detailed its readings are – up to quarter-hourly or 
even less – and the more functionalities it has, the more likely is it to be privacy-
invasive. Current research already shows how revealing smart meter data can be of 
people’s daily life in their homes, and findings such as the capacity to derive which 
TV channel one is watching from real-time energy readings
68
 suggest that the privacy-
sensitivity of energy consumption data will only increase in the future. This implies 
that if countries opt for smart meters with detailed readings that leave the privacy of 
the home, this can hardly be considered necessary in a democratic society, and hence, 
such smart meters can only be rolled out on a voluntary basis, as now will happen in 
the Netherlands. And conversely, if countries choose a relatively ‘dumb’ meter that 
conforms to the minimum requirements of European legislation (capable of at least 
daily measurements and with an interface showing readings to the customer), they can 
likely make the roll-out of such meters mandatory for consumers, in terms of compli-
ance with art. 8 ECHR.  
                                                          
65 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Promoting Trust in the Information 
Society by Fostering Data Protection and Privacy, Brussels 2010, p. 2, available from: 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation
/Opinions/2010/10-03-19_Trust_Information_Society_EN.pdf  
66 See also Knyrim and Trieb, 2011.  
67 Art. 23 and 33 of the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation, COM(2012) 11 final 
2012/0011 (COD).  
68 Greveler, Justus, and Löhr, p. 1 and 3. 
 
 
We would like to end with two concerns that remain even if legislators adopt smart 
legislation about smart meters. One is the role of consent. If countries opt for a volun-
tary roll-out of smart meters, are consumers sufficiently informed about what a smart 
meter entails? In the Dutch case, they can choose not only between keeping their 
‘dumb’ meter and accepting a smart meter, but also, if they accept a smart meter, they 
can opt for administratively shutting off the detailed readings by the network operator 
or, at the other end of the privacy spectrum, give consent to forwarding detailed read-
ings to energy suppliers or third parties. Whether consumers can make informed deci-
sions about this depends greatly on the information provided to them by the network 
operator that asks them to have a smart meter installed, and on the way this informa-
tion is provided. Should operators present the meter without informing consumers that 
they have a right to refuse, and should they suggest that providing detailed readings to 
third parties is a normal default setting (‘just tick the box here’), then consent would 
lose its meaning. Moreover, average consumers will not be aware of the privacy im-
pact of smart meter measurements; few will realise – if they are not informed explic-
itly of this – that daily readings offer insight into when they are away from home, and 
hardly anyone will be aware of the technical possibilities of deriving life patterns and 
appliance use from more detailed readings.
69
 In short, an important element of a pri-
vacy-compliant roll-out of smart meters will be to make sure that consumers are ade-
quately informed of the implications of smart meters.  
Our second concern is a more general one. The house is rapidly losing its character 
as privacy’s fortress, with directional microphones recording in-house conversations, 
cameras seeing through walls, thermal imagers detecting heat emissions, household 
appliances incorporated in the Internet of Things, the home computer permanently 
connected to the Internet, and private information such as personal texts, photos, 
books and music no longer stored in desks or on shelves but instead in the cloud.
70
 
Smart meters are yet another addition to this increasing transparency of the home. 
This requires careful consideration of the cumulative effect of the various develop-
ments that allow insight into how people live, in the one place where people most of 
all must feel free to do what they like. If our home will no longer be our castle, the 
house may be energy-efficient but it will be a cold place to live.  
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